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Executive Summary 
 
 
Current agri-environmental schemes (AES) in the UK address environmental 
management at the scale of individual farms, rather than encourage the formation 
of social organisations that structurally reflect the spatial requirements of natural 
resources.  But two options within the UK’s Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) 
do offer incentives for group action: HR8 (Higher Level Stewardship) and UX1 (in the 
Upland Entry Level Stewardship).  These are subject to analysis to learn lessons about 
landscape scale organisation and management. 
 
A telephone survey of 18 HR8 agreement holders was conducted using an open-
structured questionnaire.  These options are more likely to be taken up where (i) there 
is a history of land mangers working together, (ii) when the ESS has replaced a 
previous AES, (iii) where there are other, farming related benefits of joint action, and 
(iv) following encouragement from an outside organisation.  Agreements can be 
forged despite difficult and diverse historic claims to land use because the flexibility of 
the HR8 option allows each group of stakeholder to devise solutions that best suit their 
circumstances.  The UX1 option is compulsory for upland farmers with shared grazing 
of moorland commons.  Its major problem is requiring the register of land use to be 
updated and where necessary, Local Commons Associations to be re-launched, and 
these upfront costs are incurred before final UELS agreement is been reach.  Its 
introduction also required reform of some HR8 options. 
 
Because of (i) the success in forming environmental groups around HR8 and UX1 
options, (ii) the evidence that the scale of management is likely to deliver more 
effective AES and (iii) the acceptance by policy makers that this general approach 
represents a way forward, a proposal is made to introduce a financial incentive for 
farmers to collaboratively conserve environmental goods.  It is proposed to amend 
Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) by moving some current options into compulsory cross 
compliance to free-up points (and therefore money) to create Entry Level 
Stewardship plus (ELSplus) whose aim would be to incentivise farmers to conserve the 
environment at a landscape scale.  Farmers would be allowed to enter ELSplus alone 
or if members of ELS, they would be required to enter ELSplus if they were accepted 
into HLS.  Such an innovation would make ESS more effective, allow farmers currently 
outside ES another way into ES, allow ESS to be more climate change focused, and 
create social structures and organisations that could be used to improve the 
management of all land-based natural resources. 
 
(Key words: Environmental Stewardship Scheme, Entry Level Scheme, Higher Level 
Scheme, Entry Level Stewardship plus, landscape scale, collective organisation, 
common pool resource). 
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1 Introduction 
 
UK agri-environment schemes (AES) began in 1987 when the Environmentally Sensitive 
Areas (ESAs) programme was launched.  A brief history of the evolution of AES to the 
current Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) is presented in Boatman et al. 
(2008), Whitby (1994), Dobbs and Pretty (2008) and others.  Boatman et al.’s (2008) 
review of the effectiveness of AES allowed them to conclude that “overall, there is 
good evidence that UK agri-environment schemes have delivered significant benefits 
to biodiversity”, and that “agri-environment schemes are likely to function most 
effectively when seen as part of a package of measures, including regulation and 
cross-compliance.  To achieve maximum impact, they should be used in a targeted 
manner” (p 7).  They concluded that it is the (i) flexibility of (ii) targeted management 
options which are designed to (iii) deliver solutions to specific issues using (iv) well-
researched solutions, in (v) conjunction with the provision of good information and (vi) 
advice to farmers that are the principal six factors crucial to a successful AES (p 9).  
They note that “in general, the higher level schemes are likely to deliver significantly 
more benefit per hectare of land than the entry-level schemes, but the extent of the 
latter is clearly much more significant at the landscape scale” (p 119).  They 
conclude with a challenge: how can we achieve “the same level of benefits on a 
broader scale” (p 10), but the question “the desirability of adopting a landscape 
approach to scheme implementation” is left open as one  which “needs to be 
addressed in the near future” (p 9). 
 
The issue of landscape approaches to environmental stewardship alluded to by 
Boatman et al. would require the introduction of governance arrangements, scheme 
options and payments that incentivise land managers to coordinate their 
conservation and protection of wildlife and landscapes activities.  This compares with 
the existing piecemeal, farm-by-farm, arrangements under current and past AES, 
(with the notable exception of efforts to increase participation rates on common 
land).  Such ideas have been discussed in the academic literature for some time 
(Franks and Russell 1996; Franks 1997; McFarlane 1998; Falconer 2000; Hodge and 
McNally 2000; Falconer 2002; Pretty 2003).  For example, MacFarlane (1998) 
suggested that the UK’s Environmental Sensitive Areas scheme (ESA) should be 
extended to include a higher tier designed to encourage collective management, 
but this change was not made.  Until January 2005 the use of collective options in the 
UK was limited to negotiating joint management agreements with farmers with 
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livestock grazing rights to the commons (so-called commoners) through their 
voluntary, local commons associations.  But any agreements were usually concluded 
on “hefted” commons rather than other land.  Reluctance to develop landscape 
scale options may be because of perceived problems relating to establishing 
successful and reliable governance institutions composed of land managers and to 
the potential contractual problems which joint agreements may give rise to.  These 
typically include self-selection bias, moral hazard, adverse selection, the hold-up 
problem and the assurance problem, (see Franks in press for a discussion of 
contractual issues as potential barriers to collective contracts). 
 
While problems related to collective action are not inconsiderable, and accepting 
that “no one can possibly know whether a proposed change in rules is among the 
more optimal rule changes or even whether a rule change will lead to an 
improvement” (Ostrom 1999: p 479), Dietz et al. (2003a) conclude that “systematic 
multidisciplinary research has, however, shown that a wide diversity of adaptive 
governance systems have been effective stewards of many resources” (Dietz et al. 
2003a: p 1910).  There are also examples of successful collective management of 
natural resources in other countries.  For instance, the Australian Landcare 
Programme, encourages improvements to resource management through collective 
action (Curtis and De Lacy 1998; Wilson 2004), and the German 
Landschaftspflegeverbände groups (Prager and Vanclay 2010).  The Australian 
Landcare programme recognises that “individuals acting on their own could not 
solve key issues such as salinity, soil erosion or weeds or animal pests.  Membership 
would help landholders to share problems and ideas, as they would be working 
together to tackle problems more effectively: learning about land management at 
the property and catchment levels; accessing financial and technical assistance 
from government; and having greater opportunities for social interaction”, (C.R.E.R. 
and C.J.C. Consulting 2002: p. 112).  Other groups of land mangers who have worked 
together to deliver environmental benefits at the landscape scale are discussed in 
Franks and Mc Gloin (2007a), Davis et al. (2004) and Ingram et al. (2008). 
 
The development of more effective environmental instruments must overcome the 
mis-match between the ownership and management of land and the spatial 
characteristics of watersheds, landscapes, valuable habitats and species.  By 
developing scheme options that encourage land managers to work together at the 
landscape scale, AES can be designed to better capture any available “economies 
of configuration” (Gottfried et al. 1996) by deliberately organising intervention at the 
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scale of the target species/habitat/landscape which, because of average farm sizes 
in the UK, typically requires collaboration across farms. 
 
Therefore, concerted and co-ordinated environmental management agreements 
between and among neighbouring land owners is relatively untried in the UK and 
presents substantial challenges over and above those involved in securing contracts 
with individual land managers.  However, this paper examines two options within the 
UK’s Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS), one in the Higher Level Scheme (HLS), 
HR8, and one in Upland Entry Level Scheme (UELS), UX1, that do offer financial 
incentives for land mangers to collaborate in order to discover any lessons that might 
be useful for widening the collaborative approach to biodiversity protection and 
conservation to the landscape scale.  The following section briefly reviews the 
evidence for environmental benefits from managing land at a larger scale than the 
individual farm.  Section 3 reviews the uptake of HR8 and UX1 options in HLS and UELS 
agreements respectively.  Section 4 describes the research methodology, and 
sections 5 and 6 present the findings for lowland and upland case studies 
respectively.  Section 7 considers the key characteristics which underpin the success 
of these collective agreements.  Section 8 considers the wider lessons that can be 
learnt from the research findings, and section 9 considers the evidence from the case 
studies to discuss how the potential contractual problems of collective action have 
been addressed.  Section 10 concludes. 
 
 
2 Current UK agri-environment programme 
 
The current UK agri-environmental programme is jointly funded by the EU, through the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development with match-funding by the UK 
Government.  Compulsory modulation (the deduction at source of a proportion of 
the Single Payment Scheme (SPS) payment) of 5% in 2005 is to be increased to 10% by 
2012; at least 80% of this is returned to National governments to fund the rural develop 
programme with an element of compulsory match-funding by Government.  The UK 
also levies “voluntary” (national) modulation, which will bring the total modulation in 
England in 2012 to 19%.  The Rural Development Programme for England’s (RDPE) 
budget for 2007-2013 is some £3.9 billion, which is more than double the budget 
available for the previous programme (which ran from 2000-2006), and some £3.3 
billion of this budget is allocated to agri-environment and other land management 
schemes designed to help farmers manage their land more sustainably and deliver 
important outcomes on biodiversity, landscape and access, water quality and 
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climate change (DEFRA 2010b).  Table 1 presents information related to the 
participation in AES as of October 2010 (data from Natural England 2010b). 
 
After 2005 the Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) replaced the Environmental 
Sensitive Area (ESA) and Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS).  The ESS has two 
tiers, the Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) and the Higher Level Stewardship (HLS).  To be 
eligible for HLS a farmer must enrol onto one of three Entry Level Schemes (ELS): ELS, 
Organic ELS (OELS), or Uplands ELS (UELS) which was launched in February 2010.  ELS is 
designed to be a “broad and shallow” scheme which has been described as 
representing “a new phase in agri-environmental schemes, making them more 
readily accessible to all farmers throughout the country” (Hodge and Reader 2010: p 
270).  Farmers entering any ELS scheme are offered a menu of management options 
to select from (though some may be compulsory).  Each option has points attached 
to it, and if an average of at least 30 points/ha is selected the applicant will receive a 
payment of £30/ha providing all the terms and conditions of the ELS are met, as ELS is 
a “none competitive” scheme. 
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Table 1.  Latest facts and figures:  agri-environment scheme uptake statistics at October 2010. 
Scheme Area (ha) % of UAA - /+ % 
in UAA 
since 1 
March 
2010 
Number of 
Agreements 
-/+ of 
Agreements 
since 1 
March 2010 
Annual Value 
CSS  274,654  3.0%  -0.9  8,574  -2,012  £58.4 M  
ESA  425,333  4.6%  -0.4  6,524  -562  £36.1M  
ELS  5,293,544  57.0%  +3.4  39,634  +1,907  £137.8M  
OELS  392,724  4.2%  +0.1  2,717  +27  £37.3 M  
HLS (Combined with ELS/OELS*) 649,412 -  - 5,850  +1,281  £111.4 M  
HLS (Standalone)  108,017  1.2%  +0.4  815  +249  £20.7 M  
Total HLS  757,429  -  -  6,665  +1,530  £132.1 M  
UELS  325,958  -  -  2,793  +2,793  27.3 M  
Overall Total  6,494,272  69.9%  +2.6  58,264  -391  £401.7 M  
* Most land in HLS is already accounted for in ELS or OELS / Numbers in italics not included in overall total / UAA is Utilisable Agricultural 
Area, by which is meant farmland and associated land such as woodland and scrub / Annual Value: for CSS and ESA, the figures 
relate to the annual value of live agreements in the current agreement year.  For ES, the figures relate to the first year value of the 
agreements (the value may vary in other years). 
(Source: Natural England 2010b). 
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In contrast to ELS, HLS is (i) competitive between applications (so only those 
agreements that offer significant environmental outcomes are selected)1 and (ii) 
complex in its environmental demands: it is a “10-year tailored agreement of high 
environmental value involving complex and specialized land management” (DEFRA 
2010a).  The HLS is open to all land owners, but applications in designated Target 
Areas have a higher likelihood of being accepted (Natural England 2010d).2  
Applicants to the HLS need to discuss their intentions with Natural England Project 
Officers when considering submitting an application, and then submit a Farm 
Environmental Plan (FEP) (which is based on the Farm Environmental Record (FER)) 
which needs to include options which support locally designated environmental 
targets.  Creating the FEP is demanding and expensive, so the ESS has funds available 
to allow the farmer to buy-in the expertise needed to complete a full submission; the 
finance available to each farmer is related to the area of land farmed.3 
 
Funding for ELS has been unaffected by the UK’s 2009-10 spending review and 
budgetary cuts, and although the budget for the HLS “will grow by 83% by 2013/14 as 
compared with 2010/11” this is less than had previously been budgeted and 
expected.  Moreover, the high level of new HLS agreements already approved up to 
October 2010 means that Natural England has temporarily suspended further 
approvals for 2010/11.  Although a considerable amount of the £39 million available 
for new agreements in 2011/12 has already been allocated, Natural England 
continues to encourages farmers to apply to the scheme (Natural England 2010e) in 
2012, (in 2010/11 approximately £50 million was spent on new HLS agreements). 
 
From time to time the ESS is revised.  For example, a major study in 2008 
(DEFRA/Natural England 2008) examined eight aspects of scheme effectiveness, 
design and processes.  Among its recommendations was an adjustment in the points 
awarded for some options, a revision of some option prescriptions and the 
introduction of new options.  It also recommended that “climate change should be 
an overarching theme of Environmental Stewardship” (DEFRA/Natural England 2008: 
p 7). 
 
                                                 
1  Applications go through an assessment process that takes into account how the 
application meets the environmental priorities identified in the local area. 
2 “HLS continues to be a competitive scheme and each HLS application will be 
assessed on its merits.  Applications that demonstrate good environmental 
management for target area or theme features [relevant to applications for farmers 
outside the designated target areas] are the most likely to be successful” (Natural 
England 2010d). 
3 For a review of progress see DEFRA/Natural England (2008). 
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In 2010 a more substantial revision was made with the introduction of the Upland Entry 
Level Scheme (UELS).  Previously eligible upland farmers received financial support 
through the Hill Farm Allowance (HFA) whilst also being eligible to join ELS.  UELS was 
introduced to increase the level of environmental management of land within the 
upland Severely Disadvantaged Areas (SDA).  To pay for this, the HFA has been 
withdrawn and its budget of some £32 million ring-fenced to pay for the UELS.  The 
HFA payment composed an important revenue stream for many upland farmers 
(Franks 2009) so its potential loss provides a strong incentive to participate in the UELS.  
Whilst ELS offers £30/ha, the standard UELS payment is £62/ha but it can increase to 
£92/ha in certain circumstances.  Upland farmers who already had ELS agreements 
are incentivised to convert them into UELS by the higher payments and because the 
UELS is tailor made for upland environments, so farmer’s compliance costs will, on 
average, be lower than ELS. 
 
2.1 HR8 (HLS) and UX1 (UELS) options 
In January 2005 the Environmental Stewardship Scheme (ESS) offered financial 
incentives for group applications for a very limited number of Higher Level 
Stewardship management options.  Option HR8 is designed to protect resources that 
typically cover more than one land manager’s domain, for example inter-tidal flood 
management, wetland management and “landscapes with extensive 
archaeological or historic features” (DEFRA 2005: p. 108); these payments are 
designed to “contribute towards the cost of facilitating communal agreements” 
(DEFRA 2005: p. 108).  But as of April 2008 there were only 23 agreements under this 
option, covering 23,000 or so hectares (Data supplied by Natural England, pers. 
Com.). 
 
This analysis focuses on two options, HR8 in HLS and UX1 in UELS; both options offer 
payments for collective action.  Option HR8 is described as a “Supplement for Group 
Action” and initially paid £10/ha/yr.  Option UX1 is described as “Moorland Commons 
and Shared Grazing Requirements”, and pays £5/ha/yr.  Neither has points attached 
to them. 
 
The HR8 payment, introduced in 2005, is a contribution towards: 
“the costs of facilitating linked agreements, which together manage a target 
feature.  It is particularly targeted at common land and areas of shared 
grazing that have two or more active graziers.  It may also be applied to 
applications for agreements covering areas under more than one ownership, 
which are to be managed for resource protection, inter-tidal habitat 
management and/or wetland management” (Natural England 2010c: p 77). 
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Unlike HR8, option UX1 is a compulsory requirement of UELS for: 
“all shared grazing above the Moorland Line where there are two or more 
active graziers”. 
 
Option UX1 has no points attached to it, but is a supplementary payment of £5/ha/yr 
as a contribution towards “the costs of facilitating communal agreements and 
collaborative management of grazing livestock” (providing all other individual option 
eligibility requirements are met) (DEFRA 2009: p 112).  The payment is linked to three 
management conditions (DEFRA 2009): 
(1) All sheep must comprise hefted self-maintained flocks, except in exceptional 
circumstances (further details are provided, p. 112). 
(2) The establishment and maintenance of a voluntary commoners’ association 
supported by an internal agreement which must indicate the type of stock, system of 
land and animal management used, and the purpose of the agreement. 
(3) The maintenance of an ongoing record of active graziers and the numbers 
and type of stock for the period of the agreement, and be able to produce these 
records on inspection or when requested by Natural England. 
The regulations state that Natural England do not need to approve the commoners’ 
association agreement, but that it must be made available on demand by RPA or 
Natural England inspecting officers during the course of the agreement.  Some 
guidance on what should be included in the internal agreement is shown in the 
Common Land and Shared Grazing – Supplement to the ELS Handbook (Natural 
England 2010a). 
 
Therefore, both options provide incentives to manage the landscape at a scale 
larger than the individual farm or the land farmed by individual farmers, though UX1 is 
not a voluntary but is a compulsory requirement, albeit for a supplementary payment.  
Both options recognise the need for payments to cover the additional transaction 
costs involved with collective governance arrangements, and both have the 
collective environmental management of common land at their heart, though HR8 
can be used on any type of land and fields entered into it do not have to be 
contiguous.4 
                                                 
4 “Agri-environment payments shall be granted to farmers who make on a voluntary 
basis agri-environmental commitments.  Where duly justified to achieve 
environmental objectives, agri-environment payments may be granted to other land 
managers”, (Article 39, 2) and “The payments shall be granted annually and shall 
cover additional costs and income foregone resulting from the commitment made. 
Where necessary, they may cover also transaction cost.” (Article 39, 4) (Council of 
the European Commission 2005). 
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3 Landscape scale intervention for biodiversity and the Lawton Report 
 
3.1 Evidence of environmental benefits from landscape scale intervention 
The ministerial forward to Natural England’s England Biodiversity Strategy, “Securing 
Biodiversity: A new framework for delivering priority habitats and species in England” 
(DEFRA and Natural England 2008) identified a key policy instrument for “halting, and 
then reversing biodiversity loss” as the need to take “an integrated approach, with a 
renewed focus on delivery for whole ecosystems, and at a landscape scale” (DEFRA 
and Natural England 2008: p 1).  It recommends the key policy mechanism for 
halting, and ultimately reversing, biodiversity loss as (i) the development of more 
“partnerships” and (ii) the creation of Biodiversity Integration Groups (BIGs) to work, in 
particular, on landscape-scale projects (p 9).  This priority reflects the large number of 
scientific studies that have concluded that species and habitats need to be 
managed at a landscape scale, or at least at a scale larger than that of individual 
farms (Concepción et al. 2008; Tscharntke et al. 2005): for example, “understanding 
the negative and positive effects of agricultural land use for conservation of 
biodiversity, and its relation to ecosystem services, needs a landscape perspective” 
(Tscharntke et al. 2005: p 857). 
 
Key criteria for identifying species which rely on landscape-scale mosaics are; species 
mobility, reproductive power, the narrowness of its feeding niche (which is linked to 
the size of its home range), and the need for multiple resources over the course of 
their lifecycle (Gabriel et al. 2010; Öckinger et al. 2010).  In a detailed study Webb et 
al. (2010) identify 40 of the 358 UKBAP species associated with Lowland Farmland 
which “depend on landscape-scale mosaics of different farmland habitats” (p 14).  
Of the 98 BAP species associated with uplands, they conclude that (again) 40 “utilise 
upland habitat mosaics and are associated with a range of habitat types to 
complete their life cycle” (p. 36).  The report also advocated “pondscapes” based 
on high water quality, shallow and variable depth profiles, and dynamic 
development, with lost ponds replaced by newly created ones (p 60).  With respect 
to wetland habitats, it concludes that “many of those species not dependent solely 
on wetlands require large scale mosaics of both priority and non-priority habitats 
including grazing marsh, wet woodland and open water” (p. 69).  Of the 169 species 
associated with general woodland, about a third are “operating at a larger-scale or 
even landscape-scale mosaic level, requiring a mixture of trees, scrub, and other 
open habitats.  The majority of species in this category are birds and mammals” (p. 
108: bold in original text). 
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In their review of environmental stewardship, DEFRA/Natural England (2008) 
concluded that ESS “is making good progress and that the combination of a “broad 
and shallow” Entry Level strand (ELS) open to all, with a more demanding and 
selective Higher Level strand (HLS), is achieving the scale of coverage and degree of 
targeting required to deliver across the range of ES [environmental stewardship] 
objectives, many of which are complementary”, (DEFRA/Natural England 2008: p 6).  
However, one of the study’s recommendations was the need “to develop further 
understanding of landscape scale requirements” (p 84); the work of Webb et al. 
(2010) has begun to address his deficiency. 
 
When in September 2009 the then Secretary of State in the Department for 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) asked Professor John Lawton to review 
England’s wildlife ecological network, his letter of invitation indicated that a 
landscape focus was required: “With the effects of climate change and other 
pressures on our land, now is the time to see how we can enhance ecological 
England further.  Linking together areas to make ecological corridors and a 
connected network have real benefits in allowing nature to thrive” (Lawton 2010 p. ii).  
The Lawton Report (2010) argues for the need for a step-change in nature 
conservation in order to create “a more resilient natural environment for the benefit 
of wildlife and ourselves” (p v).  It suggests a strategy based more solidly on (i) 
protecting wildlife sites and ecological networks, (ii) rebuilding nature and (iii) 
establishing a coherent and resilient ecological network (p vii and viii), achieved by a 
combination of government leadership and “effective and positive engagement 
with landowners and land managers”.  In particular, success would need to “improve 
collaboration between local authorities, local communities, statutory agencies, the 
voluntary and private sectors, farmers, other land-managers and individual citizens” 
(p v).  In a total of 24 recommendations, eight (listed in Table 2) indicate the need to 
develop collaborative management of the environment by land managers (and 
others). 
 
Much recent work on landscape connectivity has been influenced by the impacts of 
climate change on biodiversity, but a review by DEFRA (2008) concluded that there 
was “limited support for current policy and guidance on improving functional 
connectivity by developing ecological networks to enhance species movements in 
response to climate change” (p 7).  Eycott et al.’s (2008) review of the evidence to 
support (or not support) the principle that landscape functional connectivity 
improves species movement (covering 73 studies of UK species) concluded that 
“given the magnitude of the threat posed by climate change, this review indicates 
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that measures to enhance functional connectivity should be included in habitat 
network plans” (Eycott et al. 2008: p 52).  Given the intention to make climate 
change an “overarching theme” of ESS, their conclusions provide additional urgency 
for the study of landscape scale delivery mechanisms. 
 
Table 2  Key recommendations of the Lawton Report related to collaborative 
conservation management. 
Recommendation 3.  Ecological Restoration Zones (ERZ) need to be established that 
operate over large, discrete areas within which significant enhancement of 
ecological networks are achieved, by enhancing existing wildlife sites, improving 
ecological connections and restoring ecological processes.  We further recommend: 
• ERZs should be proposed and implemented by consortia of local authorities, 
local communities and landowners, the private sector and voluntary conservation 
organisations, supported by national agencies. 
• To start and support this process, and recognising current financial constraints, 
we also recommend resources be provided , which can be accessed through a 
competition to implement 12 ERZs in the next three years. (p 72). 
ERZs are environment restoration areas, of large scale, that are used to rebuild nature 
and enhance ecological networks. 
Recommendation 6.  Government should produce a strategy to ensure that we 
protect and secure multiple benefits from our carbon-rich soils and peatlands, and 
maximise their contribution to ecological networks. 
Recommendation 10. When determining the boundaries of designated sites, 
responsible authorities should take better account of the need to support 
underpinning ecological processes and of anticipated environmental change. (p 78). 
Recommendation 14.  In view of the opportunity presented by their existing statutory 
remits, in National Parks and AONBs: 
(a) favourable condition of SSSIs should be achieved as quickly as possible; 
(b)  non-SSSI semi-natural habitat should be brought under management 
equivalent to SSSI standards; and 
      (c)  other land should be managed so as to enhance connectivity. (p 80). 
Recommendation 16.  A new type of Environmental Stewardship scheme is needed, 
particularly to help buffer sites and establish stepping stones and ecological corridors.  
This should be simple to administer, be available in key areas, and provide support for 
high cost but relatively simply management measures. (p 82). 
Recommendation 18.  Government needs to establish a consistent, integrated and 
long-term expectation of land managers to deliver parts of the ecological network.  
In doing so, consideration should be given to 
• providing more readily available, high quality advice; and 
• developing the Defra Whole Farm Approach to provide an opportunity for all 
aspects of a farm’s environmental and productive potential, simplifies regulations, 
increases transparency and gives long term commitments to both farmer sand the 
public. (p 84). 
Recommendation 19.  Habitat creation by government and its agencies, grant-giving 
trusts, businesses and the voluntary sector requires greater focus on the needs of 
ecological networks, in particular the need to contribute to Ecological Restoration 
Zones. (p 85). 
Recommendation 23.  The design and delivery of the Entry Level Scheme of 
Environmental Stewardship needs to be improved, in particular to ensure key options 
are taken up in appropriate combinations over a sufficient area.  Delivering a more 
effective ecological network may require refinements to the schemes, such as 
rewarding farmers who act cooperatively. (p 89). 
(Source, Lawton 2010) 
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3.2 The governance of landscape scale initiatives 
The Custodian of Change report (Maxwell et al. 2002) followed an undertaking given 
in the comprehensive review of the prospects for farming entitled A Forward Strategy 
for Agriculture (Scottish Executive 2001).  It identified three priority environmental 
areas for Scottish agriculture: diffuse pollution to water; biodiversity and habitat 
protection; and landscape change.5  Amongst the 29 recommendations made in the 
report was a need to identify the potential for the development of cooperative 
approaches to tackling these challenges, involving farmers and other rural 
stakeholders.  The Scottish Executive’s response to Custodians of Change (2003) 
endorsed the need for research indicating how such cooperative approaches could 
be taken forward.  In a survey largely restricted to Scotland, Davies et al. (2004: p 29) 
found “very few examples” of farmer-run or farmer-initiated cooperatives that have 
environmental outcomes.  They explained this by the “lack of incentives to undertake 
collective environmental activities, given the added management burden which 
they place on farmers” (p 29).  Where cooperation did occur, farmers generally 
cooperated “either to manage wildlife problems, or to develop a formal structure to 
attract funding and gain formal recognition as farmer representatives,” (p 29).  They 
concluded that additional incentives are needed to “improve collaboration”. 
 
Mills et al.’s (2006) study primarily focused on Wales.  It recommended a top tier 
scheme for encouraging co-operative action.  They envisaged such a top tier 
scheme operating on contiguous land areas, but acknowledge that the ES aims 
could be extended to bring small disconnected biodiversity sites into better 
management. 
 
Evidence drawn from the Rural Economy and Land Use (RELU) programme has 
provided additional support for these conclusions.  An overview of the studies this 
research program has funded recommends (i) “designing management prescriptions 
as far as possible to local conditions”, (ii) to “target uptake at the most appropriate 
scale (e.g. ‘catchment’ for water quality or ‘landscape for farmland birds)” (RELU 
2010: p 6), (iii) putting more “emphasis on creating habitat networks and restoring 
biodiversity” (RELU 2010: p 4), and (iv) shifting the scale at “which scheme 
agreements are planned, negotiated, funded and delivered … over time, from the 
individual farm to the local community of farms” (RELU 2010: p 7).  The review 
considers that these options would (i) improve the viability of farms by fairly rewarding 
                                                 
5 Some respondents in this research identified that ‘waste management’ and 
‘access’ were two further priorities which they felt needed to be addressed as part of 
any future strategy. 
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farmers for the additional costs of collaborative action (p 7) and (ii) help improve the 
cost-effectiveness of ESS (p 7). 
 
Formal groups, such as “community action groups, trusts and co-operatives” (RELU 
2010: p 10) could be based on Land Care Groups in Australia (Wilson 2004), or 
Environmental Cooperatives in the Netherlands (Franks and Mc Gloin 2007a; Renting 
and van der Ploeg 2001), using the insights offered in Ingram et al. (2008) and Franks 
(2008). 
 
3.3 Target improvement in status of sites of special scientific interest (SSSIs) 
A Public Service Agreement (PSA) established in 2002 agreed a target of 95% of SSSIs 
should reach “favourable condition”, or be under appropriate management and so 
qualify as “unfavourable recovering”, by 2010.6  UELS is one initiative introduced to 
help achieve this objective.  The importance of uplands in achieving this aim is 
evident from the fact that 57% of common land is designated as a SSSI (English 
Nature 2005; Aglionby 2009).  Uptake of previous environmental schemes (ESA and 
CSS) had required the full support of all active grazier commoners which, in places, 
proved too difficult a requirement, even though, since the Countryside and Rights of 
Way Act 2000, Natural England had greater powers available to secure appropriate 
management of SSSIs and Natura 20007 sites (Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) 
                                                 
6 PSAs detail the aims and objectives of UK government departments for a three-year 
period.  Such agreements also describe how targets will be achieved and how 
performance against these targets will be measured.  The agreement may consist of 
a departmental aim, a set of objectives and targets, and details of who is responsible 
for delivery.  DEFRA had made ten Public Service Agreements part of the 2002 
spending review.  For example, Target 2: Improve the environment and the 
sustainable use of natural resources, and target 3 aimed to preserve biological 
diversity by “bringing into favourable condition” 95% of all SSSIs by 2010.  If a SSSI unit is 
currently assessed as being in “unfavourable no change”, “unfavourable declining”, 
“part destroyed” or “destroyed condition”, it is classified as being in “adverse 
condition” and is not meeting the PSA target.  If a SSSI unit is currently assessed as 
being in “favourable” or “unfavourable recovering” condition, it is classified as 
‘meeting the PSA target’ (House of Commons 2010). 
7 Natura 2000 is described as “the centrepiece of EU nature & biodiversity policy” 
(Commission 2010). It is “an EU wide network of nature protection areas established 
under the 1992 Habitats Directive. The aim of the network is to assure the long-term 
survival of Europe's most valuable and threatened species and habitats. It is 
comprised of Special Areas of Conservation (SAC) designated by Member States 
under the Habitats Directive, and also incorporates Special Protection Areas (SPAs) 
which they designate under the 1979 Birds Directive.  Natura 2000 is not a system of 
strict nature reserves where all human activities are excluded. Whereas the network 
will certainly include nature reserves most of the land is likely to continue to be 
privately owned and the emphasis will be on ensuring that future management is 
sustainable, both ecologically and economically” (Commission 2010). 
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and Special Protection Areas (SPA)).8  These two designations together comprise 
78.6% of the SSSI area designated on land, and receive “the greatest protection with 
stringent tests to prevent damaging activities and a requirement for compensatory 
habitat creation to offset any unavoidable damage” (Lawton 2010: p 46)). 
 
By August 2010 some 93% of SSSI land had achieved PSA targets, and Lawton 
concluded that “significantly, many of the causes of unfavourable condition for the 
remaining SSSIs are due to ‘off-site’ factors that are often outside the control of the 
site owners or managers.  Eutrophication is an example” (Lawton 2010: p 47).  This 
provided the authors with evidence to recommend a general need to improve 
farmer-to-farmer collaboration (see relevant recommendations which are listed in 
Table 2).  Currently ESS has two management options which offer a financial 
incentive to improve collaboration between farmers.  The next section discusses the 
uptake of these options, HR8 and UX1. 
 
 
4 Details of the HLS and HR8 
As of May 2010, some 35,000 farmers had joined an ELS (Natural England 2009).  Whilst 
both ELS and HLS require farmers to select management options from a menu of 
options and each option has points attached to it, the differences between these 
levels are more marked.  Firstly, HLS offer less choice of options because farmers are 
required to select the management options best designed to conserve and protect 
the theme or target conservation species within their HLS region (specified target 
species and associated management options had been established for each of 
England’s National Character Areas (NCA) (formally termed Joint Character Areas)) - 
each NCA is identified on the basis of its underlying geomorphology and habitat 
structures.  Secondly, whereas the ELS adopts a farm-by-farm, piecemeal approach 
to designing appropriate landscapes, option HR8 offers a payment for group action 
to compensate for the costs of organising and coordinating management action. 
 
It is worth noting at this point that there is no suggestion or indication within the 
documentation, or any reference in scheme payments, to the possibility that 
collaborative action is likely to improve the effectiveness of ESS along the lines that 
                                                 
8 This particular problem has now been addressed to some extent by The Commons 
Act (2006) (Franks 2010; Rodgers 2010). 
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Webb et al. (2010) suggests (subject of course, to appropriate landscape scale 
focused management options being available for farmers to select).9 
 
Table 3 shows the number of HR8 agreements, the area they cover and their cost for 
each year from 2006 to 2010 (up to October 2010); Figures 1 and 2 show the uptake 
over time.  So far, HR8 options are included in 123 HLS agreements, covering some 
84,000 ha and involving £3.3 million of life-time expenditure (each HLS agreement runs 
for 10 years).  Although this represents a more than doubling since 2009, 123 is only 
1.8% of the 6,665 HLS agreements, though the agreements cover 11.1% of the 757,000 
ha under HLS agreements.  The total cost is less than 3% of the total HLS expenditure 
(£132 million, all data as of October 2010).  This shows that (i) HR8 is not a popular 
option, (ii) the proportion of land covered (11.1%) is significantly higher than the 
proportion of HLS including the HR8 option (1.8%) (because the option is more 
popular in upland commons agreements, which are larger than the average 
agreement, and (iii) with a total cost of £3.3 m over ten years, the averages annual 
expenditure is some £330,000, a small fraction of the total annual expenditure of £132 
million. 
 
Table 3  Summary of HR8 option agreements and value 
Cumulative 
data 
 
Agreements 
containing 
HR8 options 
HR8 area Average 
area per 
agreement  
Agreement 
Lifetime 
Value of 
HR8 
Average 
lifetime 
cost per 
agreement 
Average 
lifetime 
cost per 
ha 
(end of 
year) 
(number) (ha) (ha) 
 
(£) (£) (£) 
2006 6 2,679.69 447 264,702.11 44,117 99 
2007 13 7,984.07 614 466,273.54 35,867 58 
2008 39 17,591.18 451 926,776.58 23,764 53 
2009 53 32,509.26 613 1,704,675.37 32,164 52 
2010 123 83,464.02 679 3,306,264.53 26,880 40 
(Source: Natural England (Genesis Database)) Not all land in a HLS agreement needs to be 
entered into an HR8 option. 
 
                                                 
9 Additional differences include: HLS makes capital grants available, and farmers are 
expected to ensure that their HLS delivers benefits: “Each option will have a set of 
management prescriptions that you must follow, but there will be considerable 
flexibility in the means by which you achieve the agreed outcomes. Environmental 
Stewardship focuses on achieving outcomes, not just following prescriptions. 
Adaptive management allows you [the farmer] and Natural England to achieve the 
aims of the scheme.  It will not be sufficient simply to follow the prescriptions.  All 
options therefore have one or more ‘indicators of success’, which will link 
management to its intended outcome and will give you [the farmer] and your 
Natural England adviser a realistic standard of management to aim for.” (Natural 
England 2010c: p 1). 
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Figure 1.  Trend in area covered by HR8 agreement and expenditure on HR8 options 
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Figure 2.  Trend in number of HLS agreements containing HR8 options 
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5 Research Methodology 
Information relating to HR8 and UELS was gathered from phone interviews of 
participants of HLS agreements which include the HR8 option.  The underlying 
population of such agreements was provided by Natural England, but valid phone 
numbers were only available for 43 of the 123 agreements.  These were divided into 
two groups, upland and lowland, using the information provided.  Eighteen 
agreement holders were contacted, 12 upland and 6 lowland.  In addition phone 
interviews were arranged with (i) three land agents, all with extensive experience 
putting together HLS agreements including HR8 options, and (ii) other individuals - 
identified during the research – involved in managing HLS agreements which 
included the HR8 option.  The telephone interviews followed a structured 
questionnaire which identified the date of the agreement, whether it covered upland 
or lowland farmland, the hectares submitted in the full HLS agreement and the area 
covered by the HR8 option, the value of the HLS payment and of the annual HR8 
options, and how they may have changed, the number and type of stakeholders 
involved (landlord, active graziers, farmers non-active graziers, non-farmer right 
holders and other interested parties), the handling of the payment and its division 
between agreement holders, whether the HLS agreement followed a previous AES, 
and the characteristics of the land itself. 
 
It soon became clear that each agreement was characterised by individual 
circumstances, history, size and shape of the land entered, and involved a different 
combination of stakeholders.  This made direct comparison between agreements 
difficult, and therefore the results are presented case-by-case.  Sections 6 and 7 
present only eleven of the eighteen case studies which were contacted because this 
is sufficient to reveal the key similarities and differences between the HR8 options. 
 
 
6 Case Study Analysis: HR8 options in lowland HLS agreements 
Four lowland case studies are described in full.  The first two provide examples of the 
innovative use of the HR8 option’s linking facility, both involve several small local 
wildlife sites and SSSIs entered under one agreement, with a single organisation 
responsible for the management of the fragmented reserves. 
 
Case Study A: Lowland environmental trust (agreed in 2009) 
To help meet the PSA target for SSSI, a local Natural England officer arranged for six 
grassland SSSIs in the North of England, each under different ownership, to be 
managed by a single Conservation Trust in a single HLS agreement which, since the 
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agreement was made, has used the HR8 option’s “link” facility to add additional sites 
to the original agreement.10  The sites are all relatively small in area and considered 
difficult to manage, and most had not been farmed prior to this agreement.  The 
Conservation Trust manages the land using contracted graziers.  It receives all the 
environmental payments and passes a proportion to the land owners as privately 
agreed: some are happy to forgo payment in exchange for the management of their 
site, which as SSSIs they are legally obliged to manage in an environmentally sensitive 
way.  Thus far, the environmental quality of the sites is reported to have improved, 
though it is too early to say definitely and no scientific survey has been conducted.  
However, a NE spokesperson said they were happy with the progress achieved.  This 
was an unusual case, and the Trust had to be convinced that managing these 
separate sites would be a viable proposition, and to help this Natural England 
contributed to a feasibility study using money from its Regional Contingency Fund. 
 
Case Study B:  A partnership of county councils using the HR8 link facility (2008) 
This HR8 agreement involves more than four county councils.  It has helped bring 12 
nature reserves, covering some 400 ha, under a single management agreement.  The 
sites are all lowland heath land, and most are SSSI - development had left these 
nature reserves fragmented.  The organisers of this HLS pooled the HR8 option 
payment, together with a grazing management charge (based on the number of 
days the herd grazes each county council’s nature reserves) to employ a “grazing 
officer” and to establish a native breed cattle herd which grazes most, but not all, the 
reserves (some continue to be grazed by their existing graziers).  Most of these 
reserves had not previously been subject to grazing management agreements. 
 
The scheme was set up in 2008, and was actively encouraged by Natural England.  
Cost cutting means the pooling arrangement has recently changed, and now each 
county council is directly invoiced by the grazing manager for the grazing supplied.  
This HLS has also used the linking facility of the HR8 option to add additional nature 
reserves since the agreement was established.  So far, no problems between the HLS 
agreement holding partners have been reported.  These nature reserves are all close 
to urban areas and subject to recreation pressures, for example, one records some 
260,000 visits each year, with 600 regular dog walkers.  Managing this multipurpose 
                                                 
10 The Countryside and Rights of Way Act 2000 introduced “new powers for the 
conservation bodies to make management schemes imposing positive management 
obligations on landowners as to the management of wildlife sites.  Where a 
management scheme is not being adhered to they can serve a management notice 
compelling the landowner to take positive steps to manage the site and conserve its 
special interest” (Rodgers 2009b: p 565). 
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land use has always been a difficulty with these sites, and it continues to be the most 
difficult aspect of the agreement so far. 
 
Case Study C: Lowland Community Land Trust (2010) 
A Community Trust has secured four different HLS agreements each including the HR8 
option.  All these agreements involve small fields owned by several different land 
owners.  For example, the fourth agreement (secured in 2010) brings together some 
140 ha, covering 66 fields and 22 land owners.  The land owners have agreed to allow 
all the HLS payments to be retained by the Community Trust which uses them to fund 
the grazing management: it has established a native breed herd of 40 Dexter cattle.  
The owners have the satisfaction of seeing their land managed to a high standard 
which can also be expected to increases the value of their land. 
 
Natural England are reportedly “delighted” with the arrangements, because (i) it has 
helped move some of the SSSIs managed in these agreements from “unfavourable” 
to “favourable” status, (ii) it has only one organisation to deal with, rather than many 
individual landowners, and (iii) the land entered is in a HLS target areas.  This HLS 
agreement is an example of an organisation acting as a broker and farming 
contractor in an unconsolidated landscape, and provides a model for managing 
similar landscapes elsewhere. 
 
Case Study D: Tenant and landlord HLS agreement (2010) 
This HLS involves an HR8 agreement between a tenant farmer and his landlord.  It 
covers a small area of land with archaeological features.  The tenant took the 
initiative but needed to work hard to persuade his neighbouring farmer (who is also 
his landlord) to participate in the agreement, principally because the area of land 
involved is relatively small: the HR8 option payment was worth only £155/year in a 
total annual environmental payment of £9,254 and the initiating farmer believed this 
HR8 payment did not cover his arrangement costs.  He was also unhappy that he had 
not known that other neighbouring farmers had entered into HLS, as he would have 
tried to involve them in extending his HR8 option. 
 
Summary: key features of lowland case studies 
Although designed with a focus on moorland farmers, these case studies show how 
HR8 can be used on lowland sites.  A wide range of individuals were able to take the 
initiative to instigate discussions leading towards an HLS agreement including the HR8 
option.  These case studies alone record a farmer, a Natural England project officer 
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with the manager of a land trust, and county council employees taking the initiative.  
Other key lessons from the research include; 
• In only one example was the land entered into the HR8 contiguous, in three 
the HR8 option has been used to compensate for the costs involved in coordinating 
the agreement and establishing a grazing presence under a single management 
structure on small, fragmented non-contiguous high value nature areas. 
• These agreements involved land areas that individually are too small to be 
managed economically. 
• These agreements allow the owners to discharge their responsibility for 
managing SSSIs sustainably. 
• Gathering these small areas into a single agreement reduces Natural 
England’s administrative costs.  A study of agricultural cooperatives in the 
Netherlands confirms that government transaction costs are lower when dealing with 
a group of farmers, (and also that the biological efficiency of the scheme in 
increased (Slangen et al. 2008)). 
• The HR8 option was considered to be an essential part of the funding needed 
to off-set the costs of environmental management, namely establishing a grazing 
herd and coordinating grazing practices. 
• The principal driving force behind these agreements is to improve 
environmental management on a site-by-site basis, and to lower transaction costs (of 
farmers and Natural England), the motivation was not primarily to enhance 
biodiversity from a landscape perspective. 
• These agreements have so far proved unproblematic. 
• Where a small area of land entered into the HR8, the current payment is 
inadequate to cover all transaction costs. 
 
Case study D is an example of the use of HR8 on contiguous land.  A farmer had to 
work hard to persuade a neighbouring farmer to participate in collaborative 
conservation, partly because the small scale of the HR8 element meant there was 
little financial incentive to for an agreement.  This example illustrates a key barrier to 
collaborative action, lack of information; the farmer did not know that other close 
neighbouring farmers had also submitted HLS applications, had he known their 
intentions, he would have worked with them to include additional areas of land within 
his HR8.  However, farmers may be reluctant to allow neighbours to know their 
intention to submit an HLS application because of the competitive nature of HLS 
agreements.  As it is likely that applications which include neighbouring farmers by 
incorporating the HR8 option would strengthen the submission, some way needs to 
be found to make farmers aware of their neighbour’s submission, without 
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disadvantaging either applicant.  Within the current HLS application procedure, this 
duty would naturally fall to the Natural England Project Officer, who will know this 
information and who could informally suggest coordination with neighbours at the 
preliminary approval stage.  This would not, of course, overcome the competitive 
aspect of HLS vis-à-vis each partner, but should advantage both when their 
applications are compared to applications without HR8 options. 
 
 
7 Case Study Analysis HR8 and UX1 options in HLS agreements on common land 
All the case studies presented in the following section cover land that is designated 
common land.  Nearly all commons are owned by one or more landowner (thought 
in some cases the landowner is not known), and the use of the commons is governed 
by rights to graze livestock (typically specified as either sheep or cattle).  These 
grazing rights are recorded in a register, and the commons is managed by a local 
commons association (LCA).  However, despite the updating of the register under the 
1965 Commons Registration Act, registers are often out-of-date and therefore 
incorrect (Rodgers 2010).  Though rights differ between commons, in general grazing 
rights are held by farmers who use them (graziers), farmers who no longer use them, 
and non-farmers.  Moreover, a commons can be composed of a single contiguous 
block of land, or several smaller, fragmented blocks.  These features help differentiate 
moorland from the lowland examples presented in Section 6, and can make HR8 
options complex to negotiate.  The common land case studies are presented in two 
categories, firstly examples of lowland common HLS agreements, and then examples 
of upland common HLS agreements. 
 
Case Study E: lowland commons (2009) 
This lowland common of 1000 ha, which borders the sea, is divided into several parts 
and only 400 ha is entered into the HLS, land which includes a SSSI.  Poor grazing 
quality and access restriction, due to large drainage gutters, mean the land has little 
agricultural value.  Although there is only one active grazier who receives most of the 
HLS payment, all 12 right-holders are involved in the agreement and all receive a 
small share of the income, but the landlord (the Crown) has agreed to forego any 
remuneration: this division follows similar arrangements as under a previous ESA 
agreement.  These arrangements are informal, and reviewed each March at the 
annual meeting of the Local Commons Association. 
 
Case Study F: lowland commons (2008) 
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This agreement covers some 82ha which includes some SSSI land.  It switched from a 
Wildlife Enhancement Scheme (WES) (which began in 1992) to an HLS with an HR8 
option in 2008 following the intervention and encouragement of a Natural England 
Project Officer.11  The requirements of the new scheme are described as very similar 
to the previous WES, but the grazing period has been shortened.  There are four 
commoners in this agreement, two active graziers and two farmer, non-active 
graziers, but no landlord because this is an example of a commons without an owner.  
After consideration the Commons Commission assigned a part of the commons (25%) 
to the Forestry Commission, and the remainder to the “care” of two parish councils.  
The total HLS payment is some £16,000.  About £1,000 is used to pay for fencing, 
infrastructure maintenance, and insurance.  £10,000 is split 60:40 according to the 
options each grazier selected and their respective share of grazing rights.  The 
remainder, some £5,000 is divided equally between all four rights-holders. 
 
When the WES agreement was made, a solicitor had been used to draw-up an 
agreement, however, a problem occurred in 2007 when one of the graziers refused 
to remove his stock after a direct request from Natural England to do so.  Following 
this, the agreement was reviewed to require each grazier to take individual 
responsibility to comply with environmental directives such as these.  The financial 
contribution of the HLS payment was described as “very important to the farm and to 
the continuing of grazing of the commons”. 
 
Case Study G: Upland commons (2007) 
The animals that had previously grazed this 84 ha commons had been slaughtered in 
2001 due to the foot and mouth outbreak.  Little grazing had occurred since then, 
and bracken had started to take over.  Two non-farmers took the initiative and 
established a Trust with the help of Farming and Wildlife Advisory Group (FWAG) and 
a grant from the Community Commons Trust.  There are 17 commoners recorded on 
the commons register, three of which are active graziers.  The trust uses all the HR8 
option payment (£840) to cover secretarial expenses, each grazier receives £300 and 
each non-grazier £70, though no payments had been made at the time of the 
interview (November 2010) in order to ‘build up a reserve’.  There is no recognised 
landlord for this commons (though ownership has recently been claimed by a local 
family), and the single largest problem was getting stakeholders to agree, in part 
because of a dispute with respect to grazing rights which has its origins in the early 
                                                 
11 The Wildlife Enhancement Scheme (WES) - administered by Natural England - is 
strategically targeted to specific habitat restoration objectives in SSSIs. 
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1970 when the commons register was updated - a problem overcome by 
persistence, discussion and the appeal of common benefit. 
 
Case study H: Upland commons (2005) 
This HLS agreement covers 3,274 ha and includes SSSI land classified as in 
“recovering” condition.  Again the HLS agreement succeeded an ESA agreement 
which made it easier to negotiate agreement between the interested parties, with 
payments pooled and paid to the thirteen active graziers.  In this instance, the land 
lord (the National Trust) receives a small payment for their active woodland 
management: the non-active graziers receive nothing.  Because this agreement 
involved 13 active graziers it was decided to draw-up a formal agreement (through a 
local land agent). 
 
The agreement was reached in 2005, and benefited from having the HR8 option 
payment paid in all ten years of the agreement.  However, the conversion of the ELS 
to the UELS in 2010 meant the HR8 option payments had to be revised because, with 
the introduction of the UX1 payment, it fell foul of the “double compensation rule”.  It 
was agreed that the HR8 payment be reduced from £10/ha to £5/ha for the final 5 
years of the HLS agreement, so that together with the £5 from XU1 the agreement 
holders received £10/ha to meet their organisational costs. 
 
Case study I: Upland commons: with shooting interests (2007) 
A partnership agreement was written to run in parallel to the HLS when the moor was 
accepted into the scheme in 2007.  It is between the landlord, who has shooting 
interests over the grouse moor, and two active graziers.  The agreement states that all 
ESS payment be made to the landlord, who retains about 50% of the HR8 option 
payment to cover their administration costs, and returns the residue to the graziers.  In 
this case the partnership agreement is in effect the commons association, so the 
positive externalities of this agreement include (i) the reinvigoration of the previously 
ineffectual management committee and (ii) an updating of the commons register. 
 
Case Study J: Upland commons: Complex agreement (2009) 
This HLS agreement was arranged between 8 active graziers, 38 non-active graziers, 
and 5 owners of the 1,600 ha commons.  That it followed an ESA helped facilitate the 
agreement.  All HLS payments are put into a single pool and divided between 
interested parties; 50% to non-graziers, 7% to the moor owners (some £1.64/ha) and 
43% to the active graziers.  The split between active graziers was by options in as far 
as this is possible, in recognition that not all farmers had agreed to have the same 
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management options, and that some options were more expensive to manage than 
others. 
 
The HR8 payment, some £16,000, is used to pay the secretary, chairman and treasurer 
of the commons association, as agreed in the formal agreement signed by all 
interested parties, and to pay for initial set-up costs incurred in the 18 months leading-
up to the signing of the agreement.  Set-up costs included bringing the commons 
register up to date and finalising the formal agreement.  As the HR8 payment was 
found to be more than sufficient to meet these costs, it was suggested that Natural 
England should provide more guidance on how to use these payments and that HR8 
payments surplus to the costs of managing the agreement should be ‘returned to 
Natural England’.  However, the respondent did not know if the HR8 payment was for 
every year of the agreement or only for the first or for two years. 
 
Case Study K: Upland commons: non-shooting moor (2009) 
This HLS agreement covers three moors of 2,000 ha each with some SSSI designated 
land and each grazed by two farmers.  The HR8 option’s particular aim was to 
reintroduce sheep to the largest moor, High Moor (1,365 ha).  It took two years of 
discussions and deliberations, and involved considerable work to bring the commons 
register up to date, but eventually a business group was established along the lines of 
a public limited company.  This involves the land owner, the active graziers for each 
moor, and two members of the Court Leet12.  Board meetings are held every three 
months, and 18 months into the agreement everything was reported to be running as 
expected.  All the ELS and HLS money is paid into a pool.  A share is used to employ 
two moor rangers, and an education officer.  The moor had benefited from moor 
rangers before the HLS agreement to help fencing and road clearing, and the moor’s 
most difficult issue, managed burning: but it was increasingly difficult to find suitable 
employees for this role. 
 
Having agreed to stock the High Moor with two hundred sheep, the graziers on that 
moor received a payment of £25/head from the pool to allow the enterprise to 
break-even.  The remainder of the pool was allocated for capital actions (e.g. 
fencing) with the residual divided between the landlord and graziers (non-active 
rights holders received nothing).  The HR8 option was worth some £13,600, which the 
respondent believed would be paid in each of the ten years of the agreement. 
 
                                                 
12 This moor is common land and still the legal responsibility of the Court Leet, an 
ancient manorial court with records dating back to 1560. 
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Summary: key features of common land case studies 
Common land has clearly different characteristics to non-commons.  They are (i) 
often characterised by involving a large number of stakeholders, all of whom needs 
to be consulted, (ii) each stakeholder may have very different status and degrees of 
involvement, (iii) in general, many have already establish working commons 
association which provide a platform to build future collaborative agreements, (iv) 
many have a commons register detailing these involvements, and (iv) there is a need 
to agree how to compensate non-active graziers.  The key research findings of this 
survey include; 
• Updating the commons register was reported to be a most time consuming 
and therefore expensive exercise, which justifies a HR8 payment in the early, pre-
agreement phase of building a collaborative agreement. 
• Each agreement found its own way to address the various different interests of 
its stakeholders (landlord(s), active grazier, farmer non-graziers and non-grazier). 
• In doing so, they followed a similar pattern, but there was sufficiently flexibility 
to satisfactorily address the diverse combination of circumstances. 
• The distribution of payments between stakeholders followed a fairly typical 
pattern: (i) payment for the management costs associated with running the 
agreement (which generally was a proportion of the HR8 option payment), (ii) make 
an allocation to the landlord if the landlord asked for such, (iii) as far as possible 
divide the payments according to the farm-specific options each active grazier had 
selected (for example, if one farmer had selected the rare breed option, he/she 
received all of that option specific payment), (iv) make an allocation to the farmer 
non-graziers/non farmers rights holders, and (v) divide the residue between the active 
graziers, guided by their agreement holders respective grazing rights.  
• Where the HLS agreements succeeded a previous environmental agreement, 
matters progressed more smoothly.  Previous participation (i) had already updated 
the commons register, (ii) meant the graziers knew one another and their farming 
systems, (iii) gave confidence that they could work together in collaborative 
conservation management, (iv) allowed them to build a payment model based on a 
previously agreed framework, and (v) benefited from an active and effective LCA.  
• All upland commons agreements were formal documents created by a 
solicitor or land agent.   
• A formal agreement was needed not only because of the wide range of 
diverse stakeholder interests but because of the need to address all the different 
circumstances of the stakeholders and the many and various eventualities that may 
befall agreement holders.  For example, some agreement holders may own the 
common land they farm, some may be farming on secure Agricultural Business 
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Tenancies, others on Farm Business Tenancies with less than 10 years remaining, or 
they may be using grazing or annual licences, and there may be informal occupation 
of the land. 
• Some respondents reported difficulty in finding a suitably qualified solicitor to 
help create their agreement.   
• In some areas, principally those including SSSI designated areas, Natural 
England Project Officers took the initiative to introduce interested parties to each 
other.  Where the moor was within a National Park, National Park employees were 
often reported to be involved in initiating and drawing-up the HLS agreement. 
• The introduction of the UELS caused some difficulties; (i) some agreement 
holders reported holding back HLS applications until the UELS was launched, (ii) some 
existing ELS agreements up-graded to UELS to gain the higher payments and to select 
different options, but the need to include the UX1 option meant that agreement 
holders had to revise their HR8 payments so as not to fall foul of the double 
compensation rule (DEFRA 2009).  This generally resulted in reducing the benefit of the 
HR8 payment to them. 
• The change from making HR8 payments in each year of the agreement, to 
just once or twice during the ten years for agreements covering large areas was not 
contested – it had clearly been seen as being “over-generous”.  This, therefore, is an 
example of good “adaptive governance” - when it was realised the payment was 
overgenerous it was altered.  The ability to act in this way, to quickly address a clear 
error, needs to become a widespread feature of AES. 
 
 
8 Discussions: lessons from the case studies 
 
This research has shown the wide range of ways in which HR8 options have been 
incorporated into HLS agreements.  The HR8 payment of £10/ha for each of 10 years 
proved a significant inducement to co-ordinate action, though the subsequent 
reduction in the number of payments for some types of agreements will clearly lower 
its incentive value.  The HR8 option has allowed land to be coordinated between 
multiple land managers and across large areas, but it has been used differently on 
the lowlands compared with the uplands.  On the lowlands (i) organisations external 
to the collaborating farmers helped to create links between farmers where there was 
none before and (ii) often the cooperating farmers are not neighbours.  
Characteristics of uplands agreements include, (i) many HLS agreements have 
evolved from previous AES agreements, (ii) the farmers involved are close neighbours, 
and (iii) had often coordinated their farm work before through a Management 
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Committee or directly though a Commons Association - therefore much of the 
ground work needed to contact and persuade farmers to coordinate their 
environmental management had already been done. 
 
Whilst lowland farmers needed to be persuaded that their privately owned land 
would be managed better by the farmers forming a club and contracting out the 
grazing as a single unit, upland farmers had long ago recognised that common land 
was better managed by a club of active graziers, which is what LCAs effectively are. 
 
8.1 Reasons for HR8 agreements to fail 
As with much research of this type, it was not possible to contact groups who had 
tried but failed to come to a collective agreement.  Clearly this may bias the 
research because of missing information about the barriers faced by groups, and 
which of them were too difficult to overcome.  However, survey participants were 
asked to report on any examples they may have heard about ‘failed’ agreements: 
we were told of one group that had failed to reach agreement because of the 
landlord’s shooting interest, and of another because a small number of farmers flatly 
refused to participate in any environmental scheme. 
 
8.2 Division of ES payments among stakeholders 
Very few agreements have reported problems in dividing the ESS payment, despite 
the need to cater for the wide range of divergent interests (landlord(s), farmer 
graziers, farming non-graziers, non-farmer non-graziers and conservationists) and 
activities (e.g. farming, woodland management, shooting, tourism and recreation).  
In general, the environmental payments were pooled, most or all of the HR8 payment 
was taken to pay for the work of the organising body and the remainder divided 
between stakeholders.  In some cases landowners received remuneration, but often 
they did not.  Treatment of non-farmer non-graziers (who nevertheless retain grazing 
rights) varied.  In some cases they received a relatively small payment, but in many 
cases they received nothing. 
 
The link between UELS and HFA caused some complications.13  HFA created a link 
between HFA payments and farmer non-active graziers because when the HFA was 
                                                 
13 HFA was a flat rate payment based on the type of land farmed (moorland and 
common land, disadvantaged land and severely disadvantaged land).  Full 
payment rates were paid on the first 350 ha, half rates from 350 to 700 ha, and non 
over 700 ha/holding.  A claimant needed to have al least 10 ha of less favoured area 
land and a stocking density of at lease 0.15 Livestock Units/ha.  An additional 10% to 
20% was available if certain environmental criteria were satisfied. 
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introduced, non-active graziers were permitted to “use” their unused stocking rights in 
their HFA applications: farmers were not asked if they still used their grazing allowance 
on the moorland, it was assumed they did.  So when HFA was replaced by the HLS, 
these farmers argued that they were entitled to a share of the HLS to “offset” their loss 
of HFA (because the HFA was ring-fenced to pay for the UELS).  In one example (not 
a case study set out above) this problem was solved using a three tier payment.  Tier 
1 paid graziers and farmer non-graziers about £2/grazing right.  Tier two gave farmer 
non-graziers a further £5/grazing right.  Tier 3 divided the balance between the active 
graziers, again based on their grazing rights, but adjusted for any individual 
circumstances, for example, the stocking levels on one part of the moor needed to 
be reduced so the farmers directly affected received targeted compensation from 
the pool. 
 
8.3 HR8 payment: patterns, costs of agreements and start-up costs 
The factors that affect transaction costs incurred establishing HR8 options include, 
• the number of interested parties (“stakeholders”), 
• the type of interests held by these parties, particularly those related to 
unexercised rights, 
• the involvement or not of the owner of the commons, 
• the presence or not of a functioning LCA, 
• whether there is a need to persuade all farmers to participate, and 
• planning for all the eventualities over the duration of the agreement. 
 
There are many different types of interest and ownership rights related to common 
land, and this means there is considerable variation between active graziers, and the 
more diverse these interests the more difficult it will be to form an agreement and the 
more expensive to draw-up legally binding agreement, leading to higher start-up 
costs. 
 
Many of the arrangement costs were incurred (i) in the year before the agreement 
was accepted, as this was when the commons register needed to be updated and 
the commons association re-established or re-invigorated, and (ii) in the initial year of 
the agreement, to pay for meetings to discuss and agree the management and 
division of the environmental payments among stakeholders.  A pre-agreement 
payment appears to be justified and could be based on the number of stakeholders 
involved in the commons register and the final agreement rather than on the area of 
land in the final submission. 
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HR8 and UELS are designed to compensate stakeholders for their transaction costs in 
reaching collective agreements.  They are both aimed primarily on common land 
because of its high value environmental habitats (e.g. SSSIs) and, as common land, 
all land managers need to agree to participate in the AES.  But the payments do not 
take into account the additional environmental efficiency achieved from 
environmental management at the landscape scale.  These benefits should be 
openly acknowledged, and cooperating farmers in some way rewarded to 
acknowledge their contribution to the improved effectiveness of resource 
management to achieve targets. 
 
8.4 Other ways of creating ecological networks 
There are other approaches to developing a landscape scale policy than offering a 
direct payment to incentivise land managers to work together.  Table 4 shows a 
continuum from the most passive option, of simply relying on a sufficient 
concentration of environmental options, to the most active, that of incentivising 
groups of land mangers to submit landscape scale management plans (based on 
locally determined guidelines and targets).  Current policy relies on a mixture of 1, 2, 3 
and 4: each characterised by the degree of activity involved in the action. 
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Table 4. Approaches to achieving a landscape scale perspective for agri-
environment schemes. 
The aim: Landscape scale approach to land management with 
collaborative action by land managers. 
 
Approaches Active (A) or 
passive (P) 
(Principle and 
Agent)* 
(1) Rely on the uptake of (density) environmental options P/P 
(2) Rely on the uptake of sufficient prescriptions that have a high 
landscape scale orientation 
P/P 
(3) Expansion of farms so that fewer farmers farm landscape 
scale areas of land 
 
(4) Allow Natural England Project Officers to guide applications so 
that natural capital is placed where it can do most benefit at the 
landscape scale. 
P/P 
(5) Options in ES to formally coordinate the positioning of natural 
capital (trees, ponds, hedges etc) to develop a landscape 
mosaic - establishing this as a priority in refereeing ES farm 
environmental plans. 
A/P 
(6) Options in ES to formally coordinate farmers’ farming-related 
activities. 
A/P 
(7) Farmers, in a bottom-up voluntary initiative, create 
environmentally oriented farmer led cooperation. 
(P)/A 
(8) Making landscape coordination among land managers a 
requirement of participation in AES. 
A/A 
(9) Allowing farmer groups to (i) tender for predesigned 
landscape scale environmental plans or to (ii) submit their own 
proposals which also conform to local and regional landscape 
scale objectives. 
A/A 
* Active for Principal (the government) means developing new scheme options for 
collective action. 
 
One barrier to creating these new social structures is the lack of knowledge between 
neighbouring farmers over who is making HLS applications, so the role of an interested 
and knowledgeable, but outside agent would be helpful.  The most straightforward 
way of achieving collaborative management would be to use the Natural England 
project officer’s knowledge at the initial application stage.  By refusing applications 
that did not locate specific options in specific places, which the project officer but 
not the farmer knew would achieve a landscape scale mosaic; this approach could 
be achieved at almost no extra cost (though the stricter requirements may reduce 
participation levels).  The evidence provided from this survey showed that most of the 
HR8 agreements were initiated by an outside agency, whether Natural England 
Project Officer or a National Park officer. 
 
Whilst “passive” approaches appear to be least expensive, the approach selected 
should depend on (i) the degree to which collaboration in the specific placing of 
natural capital at the landscape scale is needed and (ii) the types of co-ordinated 
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management needed to benefit the environment (for example, sequential cutting of 
hay by neighbouring farmers).14  However, more active approaches require social 
structures to form which incorporate adaptive governance of the natural resource.  
These would need time to build social capital – trust, links, reciprocity, bonds – so that 
management prescriptions can be altered quickly in line with our evolving 
knowledge of ecosystem management.  Such co-ordinated, rapid, landscape scale, 
reflective responses increase farmer’s compliance costs but also the effectiveness of 
environmental conservation and protection: two justifications for increasing scheme 
payments. 
 
Table 4 shows more active ways of initiating landscape scale management based on 
farmers taking the initiative, forming environmental cooperatives and submitting a 
collective application which meets pre-agreed targets, into either a competitive 
tender arrangement or, once their submission was accepted, participating in auction 
(against other group’s submission) to establish the payment they would be willing to 
accept.  It is also possible for ecological networks to be based on land zoning, along 
the lines used in the Netherlands, where there is also a long-standing practice of 
purchasing land of high conservation value which is farmed environmentally 
sensitively.  However, this has proved an expensive option. 
 
8.6 Lessons for institutional governance 
The two scheme options considered here are only available to farmers in the uplands 
if they establish a LCA based on an up-to-date commons register.  These LCAs form 
the social structure upon which the agreement is centred.  The evidence gathered in 
this survey illustrates the role and importance of the LCA in the management of these 
collective options.  Table 5 presents the eight general principles identified by Dietz et 
al. (2003a) for robust governance of environmental resources and compares them to 
the roles discharged by the LCA. 
 
                                                 
14 In the Netherlands, where the average size of farm is smaller, collective 
agreements are more ambitious.  To take an example of a collective meadow bird 
scheme, enrolled farmers must comply with the following terms (Oerlemans 2004): 
each application must cover a minimum of 100 ha; a minimum of 15 ha must be left 
undisturbed from 1st of April until the 1st of June; nests must be protected; and long 
strips of long grass must be left to support young chicks (these can be mown later in 
the year).  Each of these options are assigned a value and the total payment is 
distributed among the co-operators as they agree between themselves.  This is an 
example of a collective contracts that requires neighbouring farmers to coordinate 
their farming activities sequentially (Franks and Mc Gloin 2007b). 
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LCAs fulfil many of the roles established within this governance framework.  However, 
they typically do not contribute to the development of environmental scheme 
options, to the selection of scheme options on their stakeholder’s land or to the 
monitoring of the environmental outcome of these options; they do not therefore 
have an active participatory role in the formal development of ES.  Their principal 
benefits are: 
• to update commons registers, 
• to inform common’s stakeholders of the new environmental regulations and 
opportunities, 
• to arrange meeting of stakeholders, 
• to develop a formal, legally binding contract, 
• to manage the financial flows that are associated with the HLS agreement, 
and to parcel it out according to the terms of the agreement, 
• to use agreed terms and conditions within the agreement to bring pressure to 
bear on stakeholders who are not complying with the agreement, 
• to act as a single point of contact for environmental bodies and government 
agencies. 
 
LCAs are generally longstanding institutions which have for a long time coordinated 
the use of common land.  This effectively allows a common pool resource to be 
managed by a club of interested members (the stakeholders).  Some have been 
more effective than others, and the recently introduced Commons Act 2006 is 
designed to help LCA increase the effectiveness of environmental management.  The 
Act gives LCAs powers to make rules, by majority voting, which are binding on all 
stakeholders.  This has reinvigorated those LCAs which had fallen by the wayside for 
whatever reason.  These legal powers therefore reduce the rights of the landowner 
and individual tenants, but will enable more LCAs to overcome the objections of a 
minority of right-holders and allow more land to be submitted to HLS. 
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Table 5.  General principles for robust governance of environmental resources (Dietz et al. 2003b) 
General principles for 
robust governance of 
environmental 
resources 
Additional comment and note of explanation Evidence on local commons association’s (LCA) structure 
and managerial role in good governance of collective 
options on common land 
(i) Devise rules that are 
congruent with 
ecological conditions 
Good, trustworthy, timely, up to date information about 
stocks and flows, at the scale of environment events and 
decisions, is particularly important for decision makers. 
Information is also needed about “uncertainty and 
values”. 
LCA are necessary to fallow HLS agreements on commons 
land. 
LCA assist land owners, forestry commission and Natural 
England (as appropriate) to improve the environmental 
condition of habitats and SSSIs. 
However, are not involved in developing management and 
user rules and have no formal role in monitoring the 
management of individual scheme options chosen by its 
stakeholders. 
(ii) Clearly define the 
boundaries of 
resources and user 
groups 
Needs to be clear who is allowed to use the resource, 
when and how (which also identifies who is not allowed 
to use the resources). 
LCAs update the register of user’s interests. 
LCAs establish the area of the land (commons) that are 
included in the collective options. 
(iii) Devise 
accountability 
mechanisms for 
monitors 
“Command and control” government back regulations 
can work if sufficient resources must be available to 
monitor and enforce rules.  However, “when the need is 
to encourage innovation in behaviours or technologies 
rather than to require or prohibit familiar ones, command 
and control approaches are less effective.  They are also 
economically inefficient in many circumstances” (p 
1909). 
LCAs work with stakeholders to maximise the collective 
benefit of HLS enrolment. 
LCAs encourage and support the voluntary participation of 
all stakeholders. 
LCAs support the HR8 option as an innovative approach to 
compensating stakeholders for the costs of working 
together. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
General principles for 
robust governance of 
environmental 
resources 
Additional comment and note of explanation Evidence on local commons association’s (LCA) structure 
and managerial role in good governance of collective 
options on common land 
(iv) Apply graduated 
sanctions for violations 
Rule of resource use must be followed “with reasonable 
standards for tolerating modest violations” (p 1909). 
Recommending using modest sanction for first violations 
and increasing penalties for further transgression, but 
noting that “community-based institutions often use 
informal strategies of achieving compliance that rely on 
participants’ commitments to rules and subtle social 
sanctions” (p 1909). 
LCAs arrange for agreements to be drafted by solicitors or 
land mangers into formal agreements. 
Failure to comply with the terms of the agreement can lead 
to sanctions as agreed in the formal contract. 
LCAs often manage the financial flows involved with 
stewardship payments, and these can be withheld as 
punishment to agreement holders who do not conform to 
their individual and collective commitments. 
(v) Establish/use low-
cost mechanisms for 
conflict resolution 
“Sharp differences in power and in values across 
interested parties make conflict inherent in 
environmental choices” (p 1909) 
LCAs form a single point of contact for Natural England 
monitors and assessors. 
LCAs reduce Natural England transaction costs and 
facilitate environmental benefits on high environmentally 
valued land. 
(vi) Involve interested 
parties in informed 
discussion of rules 
(analytic deliberations) 
“Well-structured dialogue between stakeholders, 
informed by analysis of key information about 
environmental and human-environment systems appears 
critical” to building trust and social capital which helps to 
deal with inevitable conflicts (p 1910) 
LCA must negotiate with all stakeholders in reaching their 
formal agreement. 
LCAs are involved with contacting and explaining the 
circumstances relating to the environmental management 
of the commons land. 
LCAs build trust between stakeholders and over time with 
other environmental agencies. 
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Table 5 (continued) 
General principles for 
robust governance of 
environmental 
resources 
Additional comment and note of explanation Evidence on local commons association’s (LCA) structure 
and managerial role in good governance of collective 
options on common land 
(vii) Allocate authority 
to allow for adaptive 
governance at multiple 
levels from local to 
global (nesting) 
“Institutional arrangements must be complex, redundant 
and nested in many layers”.  “Catastrophic failures often 
have resulted when central governments have exerted 
sole authority over resources” (p 1910).  Hierarchical 
organisations based on committees, sub-committees etc 
with each organisational component “nested” within 
another, whilst allowing clear lines of communication 
and areas of responsibility.  “Institutions must be 
designed to allow for adaptation because some current 
understanding is likely to be wrong, the required scale of 
organization can shift, and biophysical and social 
systems change” (Dietz et al. 2003b p: 1909). 
LCAs are not directly involved in developing the 
management options that are available to farmers. 
There is scope for using LCAs to advice on revisions to 
Environmental Stewardship and scheme options. 
LCAs establish clear lines of communication between 
environment agencies and stakeholders, are able to 
establish sub-committees where necessary. 
(viii) Employ mixtures of 
institutional types 
(institutional variety) 
If governance employs a mixture of institutional types, 
e.g. hierarchies, markets, and community self-
governance, innovative rule evaders can have more 
trouble than with a single type of rule. 
HR8 has reinvigorated some LCAs which had fallen by the 
wayside. 
Some LCAs organise management sub-committees. 
Each agreement holder must comply with statutory 
management requirements and good agricultural and 
environmental conditions.  Tenants must conform to tenancy 
agreements. 
(Source: adapted from Dietz et al. 2003b: 1910.  Principles vi, vii, and viii are "particularly relevant for problems at larger scale"). 
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9 Discussion: some implications for environmental stewardship scheme 
 
9.1 Costs and benefits of a landscape scale approach 
The Policy Commission on the Future of Farming and Food recommended the revision 
of AES because “the existing [agri environment] schemes … are not the best vehicle 
for delivering environmental benefits to a lower level across a wider area.”  The 
Commission concluded that to hit the targets required by our EU resource protection 
and habitat commitments, there was a need for “a new ‘broad and shallow’ 
scheme, involving a much larger land area and many more land managers” (Policy 
Commission on the Future of Farming and Food 2002:p 131).  Hodge and Reader 
(2010:p 270) confirm the success of this objective in noting that ELS has made AES 
more readily accessible to all farmers throughout the country.  However, the broad 
and shallow and deep and wide concepts which underpin the ESS are not universally 
supported.  For example, Whittingham (2007) argues that “AES are likely to increase 
biodiversity if a lower number of larger resource patches are provided, in contrast to 
current practices that promote many small fragmented areas of environmental 
resource” (Whittingham 2007: p 1), and Hodge and Reader (2010: p270) suggest that 
it is less clear whether the wider distribution of the available funds might at the same 
time represent a dilution of the environmental benefits provided.  Given the policy 
intentions related to developing landscape scale approaches, how can connectivity 
between areas of high biodiversity value be developed without losing the biodiversity 
gains associated with the ELS?  Now that the ESS has been in place for 5 years, it is 
appropriate to re-examine the shallow and wide and deep and narrow concepts 
which underpin it from a biodiversity and landscape perspective. 
 
9.2 Value for money, ESS reform and legal issues 
The scheduled review of the CAP in 2012/13 motivates a re-examination of the 
success of ESS from a financial perspective.  At the moment the law requires farmers 
to manage land “according to normative standards of good agricultural practice, 
and to comply with cross compliance conditions that apply to the type of agricultural 
land use he has chosen” (Rodgers 2009a)  Cross compliance regulations were 
introduced in the Fischler Reforms of the CAP in 2005.  These reforms decoupled the 
arable area and livestock headage payments from production by converting them 
into an entitlement to a single direct payment (Single Payment Scheme) subject to 
farmers agreeing to undertake the normative standards of good agricultural practice 
referred to by Rogers (2009a) – therefore environmental management standards are 
now incorporated within property rights by the legal order for the Common 
Agricultural Policy.  In the UK cross compliance combines 19 Statutory Management 
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Regulations (SMR) and an undertaking to keep farm land in “good agricultural and 
environmental condition” (GAEC), and can be seen as a set of measures that 
protects the rural environment as it now exists (Rodgers 2009a). 
 
The agri-environment schemes are “incentive payments for positive management to 
recreate or improve habitat features on his land” (Rodgers 2009b:p 569).  The aim of 
these payments is to improve or restore habitats and to improve or enhance 
farmland biodiversity.  Article 39, clause 3 of the EU Regulation No.1698/2005 states:  
“Agri-environment payments cover only those commitments going beyond 
the relevant mandatory standards established pursuant to Articles 4 and 5 of 
and Annexes III and IV to Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 as well as minimum 
requirements for fertiliser and plant protection product use and other relevant 
mandatory requirements established by national legislation and identified in 
the programme.” (Council of the European Commission 2005: Article 39, 
clause 3). 
 
The SMR are described as “directives, largely already in force on public and plant 
health, animal welfare and the environment” (Nix 2011: 143).  The cross compliance 
handbook states “many of the [cross compliance] requirements reinforce existing 
legal requirements, and for these you are not required to do anything new” (DEFRA 
2006: p 7).  And “many of the GAEC standards either reflect existing law or represent 
good farming practice, which you [i.e. the farmer] may already be observing” 
(DEFRA 2006: p 9).  Therefore, that cross compliance fails to go beyond the “relevant 
mandatory standards”, (which they are meant to do) and as a consequence no part 
of the SPS can be considered an agri-environment payment.  Rodgers (2009b:p 567) 
interprets the cross compliance requirement as meaning that “landowners will ….. be 
expected to bear environmental compliance costs up to a reference level of good 
agricultural practice reflected in property rights”.  But although the SPS are 
decoupled from production, they are not decoupled from the cross compliance 
regulations.  Penalties, including the loss of a proportion of SPS, can be imposed for 
failure to comply with these regulations.  Therefore, cross compliance does not 
incorporate the polluter pays principle but allows farmers to meet, in most cases their 
entire cross compliance costs, from their SPS payment. 
 
However, as Rodgers (2009b) points out, the cross compliance requirements (i) 
“represent a new category of property-management rule which prosecute a public 
interest objective – nature conservation – rather than to protect the property owner’s 
rights per se” (p 569), and that (ii) these environmental rules “impose positive 
obligations as an attribute of the exercise of ownership privileges.  They do not limit or 
remove property rights or land use privileges, but impose positive obligations that 
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condition the manner in which they are exercised” (Rodgers 2009b:p 569).  One result 
of which is that cross compliance environmental regulations constrain land 
management choices and by adding to their costs diminish net returns, they also limit 
alternative land use options and thereby reduce the farmer’s bargaining power.  The 
SPS is best seen as compensation against the loss of these rights and as a contribution 
towards off-setting a farmer’s cross compliance costs, rather than from the polluter 
pays perspective. 
 
There is therefore, good reason to increase the contribution cross compliance makes 
to ES.  In fact, some options that were available in ELS have already been withdrawn 
because they were largely covered by cross compliance, at the behest of the 
European Court of Auditors who asked that cross compliance and agri-environmental 
measures to be more distinctly defined (European Court of Auditors 2008).  For 
example, the soil, nutrient, manure and crop protection management plans (which 
commanded 3, 2, 2, and 2 points respectively and are included in about 11,000 
individual management agreements as of 1 September 2007 (Hodge and Reader 
2010: their Table 2, p 273)) were withdrawn after January 2007 because of duplication 
under cross compliance and because they covered what should have been 
covered under good agricultural practices.15 
 
There are other options within ELS which it could be argued address statutory 
management regulations (SMR) and good agricultural and environmental conditions 
(GAEC) more than biodiversity and landscape improvement.  For example, (i) the six 
different “buffer strips on cultivated and intensive grassland land” options (in 12,799 
agreements), (ii) ditch management (9,505), (iii) management of high erosion risk 
cultivated land (285), and (iv) the need for in-field buffering of ponds (955).  If these 
options were transferred it would improved the amount of environmental goods 
delivered by cross compliance, and so help justify the CAP Pillar 1 support payments.  
It could also be argued that options relating to the specific management of crops16 
be included in SMR/GAEC on the basis that environmental stewardship has already 
created a new category of property-management rule which control the terms on 
which access to the resource (land) is permitted (Rodgers 2009a). 
                                                 
15  Agreements made before 1 Jan 2007 are not affected by this change and 
management plans will continue to attract appropriate payments for the remaining 
life of agreements. 
16  For example, reduced depth of cultivation on archaeological features (209 
agreements as of 1st Sep 2007), over-wintered stubbles (3,874), cereal whole crops 
silage followed by over-wintered stubbles (174), management of maize crops to 
reduce soil erosion (367), and management of rush pastures (618). 
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If these changes were made, cross compliance would take on a greater role for the 
regulation and management of clean water, air and healthy soils (which is the basis 
of GAEC), whilst the total points recorded under ELS reduces, but with no loss of 
environmental benefit delivered.  A reduction from 30 to say 22, with a corresponding 
fall in payments per hectare, would free-up finance which could be used to support 
additional environmental goods.  It is proposed that this free-up money be used to 
incentivise participation in a new tier in ELS, ELSplus designed to support collective 
conservation efforts. 
 
9.3 A proposal for ELSplus 
The primary aim of ELSplus would be to develop connectivity within the landscape to 
link high value environmental habitats.  This could be achieved, for example, by 
developing corridors, stepping stones, and buffer areas (English Nature undated).  
This revision to ESS would allow species to move as habitats become unsuitable for 
them, so helping achieve DEFRA’s stated aim of making climate change “ an 
overarching theme of Environmental Stewardship” (DEFRA/Natural England 2008: p 7) 
because increasing connectivity is seen as an “essential component of adaptation to 
climate change” (Hopkins 2009:p 202).  Improving the linkages between existing high 
value natural habitats would also reduce the criticism that high value habitats are 
isolated “within a sea of unsuitable land uses” (Lowe et al. 2009: p 33).  Specifically, 
therefore, ELSplus would; 
(i) connect areas of high biodiversity value, 
(ii) help increase the dispersal and mobility of species across the landscape, 
and  
(iii) generate higher environmental benefits for the same gross 
environmentally-related expenditure. 
 
It is envisaged that ESSplus would award points for (i) collaborative action by 
neighbouring or near-neighbour land mangers, (ii) for participating in management 
options that reduced the intensity of management in specific places located 
between habitat rich patches, (iii) for active, positive management designed to 
maintain the desired habitat quality (Hopkins 2009), and (iv) for participation in any 
options need to off-set any disadvantages from improving the movement of species 
(for example, predators, pests and diseases) through the landscape. 
 
Considerable work has already been done linking species survivability to landscape 
features, but it is likely that further research would be needed to develop workable 
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prescriptions, for example Hopkins (Hopkins 2009:p 203) believes additional 
consideration would need to be given to supporting the mobility of less mobile 
species, in areas where favourable habitat is separated by long distances, and in 
research into the spatial design of types of connectivity (e.g. contiguous corridors or 
stepping stones) to suite the diverse requirements of the different species living in 
landscapes.  There would also need to be additional research into the transaction 
costs incurred developing collective organisation and managing group action. 17 
 
9.3.1 Further details 
It is proposed to allow two routes into ESSplus.  One would allow farmers to select 
ESSplus without participating in any other tier.  The other would be to make it 
compulsory for farms applying for HLS to participate in ESSplus.  Therefore, ELSplus 
remains voluntary.  To acknowledge the key role ESSplus participants play in 
delivering landscape scale environmental benefits, points for management options 
under ESS plus would be as generous as regulations and financial resources allow. 
 
It is also proposed that to participate in ELSplus, all farmer member of the same group 
would need to; (i) have some land within the same NCA (so they are faced with the 
same set of environmental objectives and similar range of management options), (ii) 
sign-up to a formal legally-recognised contract, (iii) agree options selected from a 
menu of landscape-orientated options, (iv) manage the options positively - 
incorporating the principle of adaptive co-management, and (v) understand that 
some proportion of natural capital that might need to be created is likely to be 
location specific – that is, they will have no say in where some activities are located 
on their farmland. 
 
Whilst the requirement for specific placement of some options would be expected to 
be a barrier to participation (because they may be required on land with high 
productive value), members of each group would be given flexibility as to how to 
distribute the environmental payment between themselves, much as is done with the 
HR8 payment. 
 
After the collaborative social structure is working it would be possible to allow each 
group within the same NCA to bid for the ELSplus contract by complying with an 
outline of conservation aims and means, along the lines produced by Natural 
                                                 
17 Additional greenhouse gas mitigation options could also be included within ESS, 
such as payments for the management of carbon sinks associated with land, and for 
other carbon sequestration activities. 
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England for their NCA, – instead of offering management agreements of 
predetermined prices.  Or each group could submit their own “landscape scale, 
conservation scheme” and allow Natural England to place a value on it, which the 
farmers could then accept or reject.  These tender and auction determined-
contracts might be better suited to land outside HLS target areas, where the value of 
connectivity is likely to be high, and where failure to be accepted would not result in 
disqualification for an HLS option.  These changes would (i) impose stronger positive 
stewardship obligations on land mangers, (ii) require farmers to become more 
involved in environmental conservation, which is a sign of scheme success (Colman 
1994), and (iii) provide opportunities for farmers to pass on information about 
environmental management to one another, which is one of their preferred way of 
learning (Defrancesco et al. 2008). 
 
 
10 Conclusions 
 
There is now considerable evidence that addressing environmental management at 
the landscape scale will deliver additional environmental benefits, and make current 
AES more effective.  At present, HR8 and UX1 are the only options available in ESS 
which incentivise group action.  They do so by compensating members for the 
transaction costs incurred developing groups and group activities.  The evidence 
from this survey finds the groups have no particular trouble in the collective approach 
that underpins both options.  A comment from one interviewee is pertinent here, 
referring primarily to the confusion that arose when UELS replaced HFA; he said “the 
key problem with the HR8 agreement was the way in which various policies intersect, 
not the ways in which the farmers, land agents and other stakeholders interact”. 
 
Both options are designed to be used on commons land, and there has been greater 
uptake of the HR8 option in HLS in upland areas.  Land managers in these areas have 
long coordinated their farming practices, relying on cooperation between graziers, 
and in doing so farm the commons as a common pool resource.  Their LCA is a club, 
members of which have a common interest - which is expressed through this 
coordinated management of land and flocks. 
 
Uptake of HR8 in the lowlands has largely been at the encouragement of an outside 
organisation, and in the main the owners of the land involved were willing to 
contract-out the management of their fields rather then farm the land individually, or 
jointly between themselves.  Both upland and lowlands stakeholders have 
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successfully organised and arranged the handling of payments and their distribution 
between agreed stakeholders in their own ways and to their own satisfaction, 
overcoming problems as they arise. 
 
The success with which these options have been used encourages further 
consideration into how collective arrangements could be made more central to ESS, 
especially as landscape scale design would help in the objective of developing 
climate change as an over-arching theme of ESS.  This study has examined a range 
of options, from developing the essentially passive approaches currently used, to the 
more innovative (active) options, in which farmers themselves lead by establishing 
their own groups and formulating their own proposals for landscape scale options.  
Although the current financial climate suggests little additional money is available 
above that already earmarked for agri-environment schemes, the forthcoming 
reform of the CAP offers opportunities to restructure the CAP payments from pillar 1 to 
pillar 2.  However, there will be resistance to this, so it is suggested that a somewhat 
similar result could be achieved by greening pillar 1 by moving selected options 
available under ELS into cross compliance, this would free-up points and money to 
use to establish an ELSplus option, and make the claim that cross compliance is an 
environmental payment more defendable. 
 
Additional, landscape scale environmental options will need to be developed 
together with estimates of the transaction costs of different types of farmer groups.  It 
is suggested that these payment should reflect the number of farmers and their 
diverse circumstances, rather than the area of land entered, because these are the 
variables that impose most management time, and hence cost, to developing 
agreements. Money freed-up by making cross compliance more environmentally 
demanding would be available to use to compensate farmers for these additional 
costs. 
 
The evidence from this study suggests establishing groups of farmers is possible and 
can create robust governance structures, which could potentially help manage 
other types of natural resources, for example, altering the water table, using land as a 
flood plain or managing if as a carbon sink.  This would further the intentions of 
converting ESS to be a more effective instrument for combating climate change.  The 
ELSplus landscape option builds on the current system of cross compliance and agri-
environmental schemes, and on the evidence related to the effective scale of 
intervention by AES.  As such it represents an evolutionary rather than a radical 
change.  It shows the measures that can be taken to start developing appropriate 
44 
 
forms of social organisation that structurally suit natural resource management.  And 
despite the current financial constraints, it offers a mechanism for improving the 
environmental cost-effectiveness of current SPS and AES expenditure, with relatively 
little reform of the existing ESS; it is therefore in accordance with many current policy 
aims, objectives and intentions. 
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Appendix 1.  Key changes to direct upland support payments 
1975 Introduction of Beef Variable Premium Scheme (BVP) in UK.  Temporary 
scheme, subject to renegotiation each year in Brussels.  Price support 
mechanism triggered by average weekly prices falling below monthly target 
price. 
1976 Introduction of Hill livestock Compensatory Allowance (HLCA) - UK scheme to 
aid suckler cow and breeding ewe producers in Less Favoured Areas. 
Headage payments. 
1980 Introduction of Suckler Cow Premium (SCP) (to increase the returns to beef 
producers without supplementing dairy farm incomes).  Headage payments 
subject to national quota. 
1981 Introduction of Sheep Annual Premium (SAP) scheme.  Headage payments. 
1989 Beef variable premium ends.  Beef Special Premium (BSP) introduced in UK - 
headage payments made on male cattle aged at least 7 months.  Claims 
limited to 90 animals a year per producer. 
1991 Sheep variable premium phased out.  Limits on number of ewes eligible for 
SAP full rates.  Beyond these limits half payment made SAP.  Supplementary 
SAP payments brought in for those in Less Favoured areas. 
1993 Second BSP payment introduced for male cattle aged 20 months.  Finite limit 
on number of ewes supported by SAP.  Extensification payments introduced 
for recipients of SCP and BSP rewarding low stocking densities (based upon 
animals claimed for under BSP, SCP, SAP and dairy cows needed to produce 
any milk quota held). 
1997 BSP payments now only paid to bulls once in animal’s lifetime must be aged 
at least 7 months. 
2000 Agenda 2000 - Introduction of slaughter premium to support cattle 
producers.  Final year of HLCA.  Heifers may now make up to 20% of a 
producer’s SCP claim.  Extensification premium no longer linked directly to 
BSP and SCP, all animals over 6 months on holding are now included in 
calculation of stocking density. 
2001 Removal of 90 head limit on BSP.  Introduction of Hill Farm Allowance (HFA) 
area based payment to support farming (suckler cows and breeding ewes) 
in less favoured areas.  Enhancements available for environmental criteria. 
2000-
2002: 
Agenda 2000 - Increases in euro BSP and SCP premium rates as 
compensation for intervention price cuts. 
2004 Removal of minimum heifer requirement for SCP.  Last year of direct subsidy 
payments (e.g. SCP, BSP, SAP, Extensification scheme and Slaughter 
premium). 
2005 Introduction of Single Payment Scheme and Environmental Stewardship. 
2008 HFA limited to the SDA. 
2010 Replacement of HFA with Uplands ELS.  All farm types in SDA eligible. 
 
 
